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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	
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4	BACKFIT APPEAL MEETING WITH	
5	MAINE YANKEE	
6	***	
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8	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission	
9	One White Flint North, Rm. 4B-6	
10	11555 Rockville Pike	
11	Rockville, MD 20852-2738	
12		
13	Friday, July 10, 1998	
14		
15	The above-entitled meeting commenced, pursuant to notice, at	
16	1:00 p.m.	
17		
18	PARTICIPANTS:	
19	JOHN ZWOLINSKI, Chairman	
20	FRANK CONGEL	
21	GUS LAINAS	
22	MICHAEL WEBB, Maine Yankee Project Manager	
23	DON DAVIS, CYAPCO & YAEC	
24	DUKE WHEELER, NRC/NRR/DRPM	
25	JOE GRAY, OGC	
	PARTICIPANTS: [Continued]	
Aì	DAN BARSS, NRC/NRR N	
RI EY	L STEVE CROCKETT, NRC/DCMEXM	
& A\$	J. E. BEALL, NRA OCM/EM S	

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 [1:05 p.m.] 3 MR. WEBB: Good afternoon. I would like to welcome 4 everybody to our NRC headquarters. My name is Michael Webb and I'm the 5 project manager at NRC for Maine Yankee. 6 This session this afternoon has been noticed as a meeting 7 between the NRC staff and members of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power 8 Company staff. As stated in the June 30th, 1998 meeting notice, the 9 purpose of the meeting is to provide Maine Yankee the opportunity to 10 discuss its appeal of an NRC backfit determination regarding a Maine 11 Yankee Emergency Preparedness exemption request. 12 Before we start the meeting I would like everybody in the 13 room to introduce themselves, beginning with the NRC backfit review 14 panel chairman. 15 CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I'm John Zwolinski, the acting director 16 for the Division of Reactor Project East. 17 MR. CONGEL: I'm Frank Congel, I'm the director of the 18 incident response division. 19 MR. LAINAS: I'm Gus Lainas, I'm acting director division of 20 engineering. 21 MR. WEISS: Sy Weiss, I'm project director for non-power 22 reactors and decommissioning. 23 MR. BEEDLE: Ralph Beedle, NEI. 24 MR. DAVID: Don Davis, Connecticut Yankee, Yankee Atomic. 25 MR. GRAY: Joe Gray with General Counsel's Office, NRC> MR. WHEELER: Duke Wheeler, NRC.

MR. BEALL: Jim Beall, Commissioner -- Office.

MR. CROCKETT: Steve Crockett, Commissioner -- Office.

MR. BARSS: Dan Barss, Emergency Preparedness Specialist in

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and myself were appointed to serve as a backfit review panel. The

licensee in their letter of May 6th, 1998 in which the subject was appeal of NRC determination concerning Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company claim of backfit regarding beyond design basis accidents in spent fuel pool requested that this matter be addressed outside the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

However, in a letter dated June 25, 1998, the EDO informed Maine Yankee that this issue had been forwarded to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The resulting action was to appoint this panel with the specific charter of recommending to the office director whether or not the criteria being used by the staff in evaluating a Maine Yankee request for relief from off-site emergency preparedness requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) constitute a backfit.

The panel following the guidance of Office Letter 901 has undertaken the review of correspondence between the staff and licensee and has met with the staff to gain a much better understanding of the staff's efforts today.

The next step is to hear from you, Maine Yankee, regarding this appeal. Following this meeting the panel will provide the results of our deliberations to the office director.

As a panel we believe it is very important for you to be -for you to focus on specific positions you hold providing context and
basis as appropriate. Be assured that the panel will not be hesitant to
ask questions.

I trust you all are aware that the three of us have not been involved in activities associated with Maine Yankee for a considerable period of time, and certainly have not been involved in the review if your exemption request. With this brief overview, I will turn the meeting over to you, Mr. Meisner.

MR. MEISNER: Thank you, appreciate it.

[Slide shown.]

AN RI EY ŵ MR. MEISNER: We are going to cover several things today. Is this microphone on? Can you hear okay?

I think while we're all probably familiar with the zirc fire issues themselves, I think the staff's denial introduced some much more fundamental and generic issues and I think we need to talk about that. And as you indicated, John, there's a context to all of this and I'd like to spend a little time making some backfit rule observations independent of just the zirc fire analysis issue itself. And then, of course, we need to deal with the zirc fire issue and specifically address the NRC's backfit denial letter and their basis and provide our rebuttal to that.

And then when the Maine Yankee portion is done, NEI would like to provide some discussion with an industry viewpoint of how they feel the backfit rule should or should not be applied in this case. And Don Davis with Connecticut Yankee would have some remarks as well.

In case you don't know, Connecticut Yankee is in a very similar situation to Maine Yankee as far as the length of time the plant has been shut down and the applicability of a zirc fire analysis to that facility.

[Slide shown.]

MR. MEISNER: So I think there are some fundamental issues that we need to talk about and the first one that's on the list here is really one that I would like to dispose of and not really address much from here on out.

As you all know, our original submittal raised the concern that some members of the NRC felt that the backfit rule did not apply to decommissioning plants. We strongly oppose that position and we are assuming that since we're now going through the backfit process and the

quess.

backfit appeal process that that's not a concern for the instant issue with Maine Yankee and the zirc fire. And that the panel deliberations will be conducted and whichever way the panel decides on this issue is how NRR will go as opposed to bringing newly, at a late date, the idea that the backfit rule doesn't apply to decommissioning plants.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: If I can interject, I think the fact that the panel exists a priori for this issue in and of itself I think the agency is choosing to say it does apply. I think there's a broader or bigger issue that we're not going to address in our deliberations.

MR. MEISNER: Okay. Good. And I agree with that.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay. You may have just said that, I wanted to sharpen it just a little bit.

MR. MEISNER: And, as usual, you said it better than I did.

John and I have some history of some turbulent times, I

While Maine Yankee felt that the zirc fire analysis requiring that for emergency plan relief was itself a backfit with the staff's denial of our backfit request we suddenly have an entirely new issue. And we're going to talk about that to some extent here. No longer is the issue zirc fire. I think it's fair to say that the staff has never objected that imposing this on Maine Yankee was a new staff position which is a critical element of the backfit rule, nor did the staff's denial letter really address anything technically at all to do with zirc fire or emergency planning. And while I'm happy to see the emergency planning reviewer here, and while we will be going through some background discussions on our position on zirc fire, the real issue today comes down to the staff's position on denial and their position is — and I'm paraphrasing it here is that licensee initiated actions don't have the protection of the backfit rule. That's a very broad and

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AN RI EY & AS generic finding on the part of the staff and it goes well beyond applicability to decommissioning plants or the zirc fire analysis and attempts to affect a great deal of the activity that the nuclear industry is involved in today. And I'd like to address that to some degree.

And whether that licensee-initiated action is voluntary or involuntary, the staff went on further to say that voluntary actions on the part of licensees also did not enjoy the protection of the backfit rule. And we need to explore that issue as well as whether or not the emergency plan exemption requests that Maine Yankee requested are in fact voluntary. And I think we'll find that they're not.

So those are the key issues we intend to focus on today based on the staff's denial letter.

[Slide shown.]

MR. MEISNER: But before we get into that, I do want to put some -- place some context to the backfit rule and give you some personal observations. And please recognize that while I say things like "typical industry viewpoint" on here, these really are personal based on talking to individuals throughout the industry and they don't reflect a formal industry position as such.

But this part I found so important and I don't usually do that except for the most recent meeting that you and I were in, I've written this down and I'd like to go through it and read you the observations I have in this area.

So when you get right down to it, the backfit rule is the only protection the industry has against turning staff opinion into requirement. But that protection is seldom exercised by the industry.

And when you ask around and you ask, why don't you take more advantage of the backfit rule, in some cases you'll get a response that

AN RI EY & we fear retaliation. But, you know, the more predominant reason and the overriding reason in the minds of the people that I talked to is that the backfit rule is viewed as toothless. It's an afterthought. And, again, this is the view of people in the industry. This is perception that I'm trying to relate to you. It's used as an afterthought that the staff develops a position they'd like to impose on a licensee and then rather than identify that position as a new staff position and follow the backfit process, they search for creative ways to avoid the backfit process.

Our view is that the staff often asks, why don't I have to consider backfit rather than asking, is this a backfit, which is an entirely different question. And personally I've dealt with enough of these backfit issues in my career and in doing that have gotten a lot of feedback from NRC staff. Enough feedback to know that when the staff goes to OGC, for instance, for help on a potential backfit issue, the OGC doesn't always respond by making a determination -- a firm determination this is or is not a backfit, rather OGC will at times ask the staffer whether or not they want it to be a backfit and will support either position.

That's not the way the process is intended to work in my view. And it leads to creative lawyering rather than a disciplined process of backfit review.

In any case, we believe that in general the NRC does not comply with the spirit of the backfit rule in two respects. First the staff's backfit guidance requires all -- all NRC personnel to review new staff positions and identify backfits.

I think it would be an interesting exercise to pull together L a group of project managers and reviewers and ask them how many backfits they've identified in the last year. I suspect you'll find none. And

furthermore, I suspect you'll find that few consider it to be their responsibility at all.

The second area we believe the staff does not comply with the spirit of the backfit rule is when on a few occasions a licensee does raise a backfit concern. In a great majority of those cases, as I said earlier, our impression is that the creative lawyering takes over and the true issue is really overlooked.

In all this and I'm dealing with perceptions by the industry again, all this leads to empathy on the part of the industry as far as the backfit rule is concerned. And I think it's particularly telling about the industry's confidence in the backfit rule that as far as we know this Maine Yankee Backfit Appeal Meeting is the first conducted in the last six years.

And the reason is not because of the sparsity of backfits. The reality is that backfits occur frequently, but they're not dealt with as such by the staff. And I'll give a couple of examples in the rulemaking area as well as some recent experiences of other backfits at Maine Yankee.

There is a proposed rulemaking out for comment. It's titled "Miscellaneous Changes to the Licensing Requirements for Independent Storage of Spent Fuel". Part 72 ISFSI rule changes. And these really are miscellaneous. It's to -- it's to make various changes in the Part 72 rules and fix them up where they were in some cases incorrect or clarify them.

And in Part 72, you know, just like 50.109, the backfit rule
-- there's a backfit rule and it prevents additional elimination or
modification of procedures or organization required to operate an IFSFI.

Now, if you look at this closely, there are two areas where in these miscellaneous changes the staff clearly levies new requirements

that would necessitate on the part of the licensees that they make procedure changes in order to comply. There is new recordkeeping and new recording requirements. And the new reporting requirements, but the way includes more than a page of detailed reporting areas that are now -- or the staff is proposing to require for Part 72 licensees.

Yet, you know, kind of defying all logic, the conclusion in the backfit analysis for the proposed rulemaking says, the NRC has determined that the backfit rule, in this case 10 CFR 72.62 does not apply to this rule because these amendments do not involve any provisions that would impose backfits, in other words, any changes to licensee procedures or organization.

There's another example of a proposed rulemaking that's out for comment now and I'm not as intimately familiar with it as George is and I'd ask him to just describe it for you.

MR. ZINKE: There's a proposed rulemaking that deals with an IEEE -- I believe it's 603 standard that deals with instrumentation.

And the gist of the rulemaking is that for plants -- for new plants or for existing plants that do a major change out of certain important to safety instrumentation systems that the new standards of the IEEE would then apply. And it would apply to plants that are making this type of a major design change under 50.59. The gist of the backfit analysis was that since design changes like this kind of a major replacement of an instrumentation system, since that type of design change is voluntary, that the backfit rule doesn't apply. So the gist is then that a licensee making allowed changes under 50.59 that the backfit rule doesn't apply and the Commission can impose new requirements.

MR. MEISNER: And that's very similar to the staff's basis for denial in that voluntary or even just licensee-initiated activities fall out from under the protection of the backfit rule. But let me give

you so months

you some substantive examples from Maine Yankee in just the last nine months as we're proceeding into decommissioning.

There are defuel technical specifications. In reviewing the defuel technical specification submittal from Maine Yankee, the staff, in my view, really should have relied upon the improved tech spec program. After all, spent fuel pool safety is equally applicable to operating plants. In fact, more so in that the spent fuel pool accidents are more consequential for operating facilities because of the shorter spent fuel decay time compared to a plant that's been shut down for quite some time.

I think most of you know a lot of effort went into the improved tech spec program. And I know personally as one of the original industry architects of the program and George as well, as very early implementers of that program at Grand Gulf they were familiar with the excruciating difficulty the industry and staff went through to reach agreement on improved tech specs. It was years and years of hard work. All the technical issues associated with spent fuel pools were considered in that process. And a determination was made as to whether the -- whether particular parameters or programs should be included in the improved tech specs.

However, for reasons that have never been justified under a backfit safety basis, for Maine Yankee and for other currently decommissioning plants, the decommissioning branch staff is requiring program controls and tech specs for chemistry cold weather protection and other things as well as a fuel pool temperature tech spec that was rejected during the improved tech spec review.

I have to say I'm somewhat ashamed to say that at Maine
Yankee we caved to the pressure. And it's really that old -- remember
when a lot of plants were getting licensed, the pre-licensing issue of,

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if you want to get your review approved in a timely fashion, then you really need to voluntarily sign up for what the staff wants. In our case, our defuel tech specs were sitting on a manager's desk pending his concerns about adding these various things to the tech specs with the implication that it might not move off his desk until we agree.

So with time pressures and with the NRC's approval actually becoming critical path for our decommissioning, we reluctantly proposed the changes on our own and they were added to our defuel tech specs and approved.

Now, if I was another plant, if I had the luxury of some time, I would never have allowed that. It's clear backfit, in my mind, and I think most people's minds. It shouldn't happen like that. But we observed in that process no inclination on the part of the staff to fulfill their primary responsibility under backfit guidance to identify and deal with backfits.

Let me give you a few examples in the security plan exemption area. First, last spring we were informed by our project manager that the security branch would require that in addition to pursuing the exemption process, after approval of the exemption, we would need to then submit a license amendment request for the same changes. Now, that's not a trivial process, you know, as far as time, notice under SHALI as well as the potential for a hearing.

Now, we know that many security exemptions have been issued, and none to our knowledge ever required dual processing as exemptions followed by license amendments. Again, this is a clear backfit in our mind. That requires us to alter our processes and how we provide proposed changes to the NRC.

Now, in this case we pushed back and over a period of several fairly contentious phone calls and internal staff meetings we

a very uncomfortable position of having to challenge a staff position which had absolutely no basis not precedent. And as you know, you do that enough and we've done that a lot in the Maine Yankee decommissioning, you start to develop an adverse reputation with the staff. That's not fair to put us in that position. The staff should really be policing itself with respect to new staff positions and then when new staff positions come up, identify them as backfits and deal with them as such.

eventually won the point. But we were unnecessarily, I think, put into

Now, staying in the security program area, a couple of weeks ago Maine Yankee received approval for various security program exemptions. We also received disapproval for some. And in documenting their disapproval the staff introduced new staff position, in other words, backfits, that were unsupported by regulation. And I want to briefly cover a couple of them. This is in the SER the staff issued on June 29th.

One of the exemption requests we had in had to do with the vehicle barrier or vehicle threat requirement. We had asked for exemption to the regulation to have a vehicle barrier. And in denying the letter or in denying the request the staff also noted that until the Commission has determined how much damage an explosive-laden vessel or vehicle could cause to the spent fuel, the vehicle barriers must remain in place. That's nowhere in the regulation, that's nowhere in the guidance documents that I'm aware of as far as the Commission having to determine themselves how much damage this explosive-laden vehicle could propose to the spent fuel. In fact, the real process is licensee do those analyses and determine whether they're in compliance or out of compliance with the regulations and the staff comes in and reviews those analyses.

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A similar example is we had asked for an exemption from the requirement to maintain an isolation zone adjacent to the protected area barrier. You know, this is a -- I don't know what, a 10-foot -- I've forgotten the distance -- zone to look for intruders. And in part, in denying the request the staff noted that an external isolation zone is required at defueled reactor sites. Again, there is nothing in the regulations about that.

The staff is adding a new interpretation onto a regulation as part of a disapproval process and as a result trying to bind our hands and in this case impose new requirements on the licensee. And there are other examples that I'll be happy to share with you. But the point is that backfits, unlike what you may have believed, are routine and really not noticed by the staff. And I dare say that on the security examples I mentioned that it probably never even occurred to the staff the question of this new staff position was a backfit. I'd be very surprised if anybody even raised the question.

So, I know this was kind of an extended introduction, but I thought it important to provide a context and an understanding that the zirc fire analysis that we'll be talking about and the staff's basis for denial of that original backfit request is not at all unique. It goes on all the time. And I wonder if there might not be a general problem in the staff where they really don't take backfit as a matter of responsibility and instead look at it as something to work around or something I add on later at the end to deal with, you know, when I'm finished with everything else. And I ask you as a panel to consider that and take a look at it. And we -- and I think many people I know in the industry can provide any number of other examples like that.

MR. LAINAS: Yeah, excuse me, Mr. Meisner, those examples that you gave, did you claim backfit? Did industry claim backfit on it?

AN RI EY & AS MR. MEISNER: You mean like for instance the security examples?

MR. LAINAS: Yeah, as an example.

MR. MEISNER: Yeah, and we just got those a week and a half ago. And we did respond back to the staff and we have implemented activities contrary to those staff positions and we noted in our 50.54p evaluation that in fact the staff really should look at those as new staff positions and backfits.

MR. LAINAS: But is your point that the staff should have caught it as a backfit?

MR. MEISNER: Yes.

MR. LAINAS: Or is there something wrong with the backfit process as far as, you know, a licensee -- well, the case in point that we're talking about now?

MR. MEISNER: Yeah, well, the first step in the backfit process and it's real clear in the staff guidance is that every NRC staff member is responsible for determining when they have new staff positions whether or not they're backfits. And in that respect I don't feel the staff really pays much attention to it.

MR. LAINAS: But with respect to the licensees our industry, you know, following back the procedures is there a problem with that?

The staff doesn't pick it up, but industry pushes it, is there a problem with that process?

MR. MEISNER: Yes. And I think what we'll be going through here today is a very good example of that that -- that I believe -- and, again, this is personal belief, that the staff does get involved in creative lawyering to come up with reasons why not to apply the backfit rule as opposed to simply moving through the process.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: In your remarks, though, you've covered

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a lot of ground. For example, in the rulemaking arena, we have processes internal to evaluate backfit through the committee review of generic requirements, for example, long before a rulemaking takes place, plus the advance notice of rulemaking, noticing, things of that sort versus the example you just cited on security in which apparently the exemption was denied or found not acceptable. Those are kind of two different issues, but I think I hear you saying that backfit across the board in those arenas is not working correctly. And I believe that.

MR. MEISNER: Yes.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Is that the short of it?

MR. MEISNER: One of the examples I gave you about increased recordkeeping and reporting requirements --

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Yes.

MR. MEISNER: -- in Part 72, I think any objective reader would say those are clearly changes to licensee procedures that matched right up with what the backfit rule was intended to protect against, yet the staff concluded there is no backfit here, that in fact, they weren't changing licensee procedures as a result.

And just to make clear, I don't want you to get the feeling that those denied exemptions, that's fine. That's fair. There is no problem with that. What we object to is having denied it then coming back and imposing new additional requirements in that area that weren't in the regulations. And that's the part that I felt was the backfit.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: So in the example of security, for example, just saying it's denied without going into a lot of this other

MR. MEISNER: That's fair, sure.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: -- explanation is what you would expect to have seen?

MR. MEISNER: That's right.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I see.

MR. MEISNER: And having gone into more explanation that new staff position being identified as such and going through the backfit process.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: What I'm trying to draw the linkage to, and maybe you can help us is your introduction and how it will tie into the specifics of the zirc fire and the criteria of the staff is being used. So I'm trying to formulate in my own mind the nexus to getting to what I believe the substance of the matter is.

MR. MEISNER: And I think the real nexus is that this is not an isolated case.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay.

MR. MEISNER: That it occurs all the time and I wanted to give you some feel from the point of view of the licensee that you really shouldn't treat the zirc fire thing as a unique instance. There may be a more general problem underlying that that needs to be looked at.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Well, thank you for those remarks.

MR. MEISNER: Okay. So for a few minutes I would like to turn it over to George Zinke and ask him to discuss some of the basics in the zirc fire issue. Do you want to talk from there, George and I'll put these up or --

MR. ZINKE: Let me trade places.

[Slide shown.]

MR. ZINKE: What I want to discuss briefly is not the basis for appeal, but some background, the context that will allow you to understand our basis a little bit better. I want to establish for you the various new and evolving NRC positions that have -- that surround

the zirc fire issue.

In the history of the zirc fire issue there's a lot of documents that deal with this beyond design basis accident and the spent fuel pools. But the NUREG 1353 in April '89 resolved the issue. Within that NUREG and the evaluation they determined in the NUREG was that if the NRC was to impose new requirements that they would be a backfit, but there was an analysis included in the NUREG. Some important things that were in the NUREG it established a generic 17 months at which point in time the event of issue would no longer be possible. Within the NUREG it concluded that there was insufficient reason to create new requirements. Within the NUREG it did not credit the evacuation or any EP actions in coming up with this conclusion.

Subsequent to that Rancho Seco in June '89 shut down. The NRC approved their insurance exemption 588 days after shutdown. And the E plan, 625 days after shutdown. In both of these approval, the issue of zirc fire was not -- it was not an issue. It was not a basis for either of those exemptions being granted.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Is your point that NUREG 1353 didn't impose new requirements? NUREGs really can't, I guess --

 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ \operatorname{ZINKE}\colon$$ The NUREG concluded that there were not new requirements that were justified at that point in time.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: And then when you move to the issues of Rancho Seco, nothing carried over from that NUREG?

MR. ZINKE: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Is that what the point is going to be?

MR. ZINKE: Yes.

MR. MEISNER: I guess I would say that another way.

Everything carried over from the NUREG because the conclusion of the NUREG was that zirc fire was not an issue to be addressed.

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MR. ZINKE: So the approval of Rancho Seco was consistent with the NUREG. There were no new requirements associated with the ZIRC fire that were necessary in order to prove those exemptions.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Was the NUREG from your review developed for a specific stage of operation -- of plant operation that is, construction, power operation, decommissioning, or power operation or is silent?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MEISNER: We've got an overhead to address that in a few more.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay.

[Slide shown.]

MR. ZINKE: Again, Trojan, they were shut down in November of '92. There E plan exemption was granted 325 days. The Trojan submittal, their E plan exemption was contingent on Zirc fire. The staff asked them to perform an analysis and the conclusion was that, you know, it could happen, but very low probability. And so based upon the low probability of a seismic event, the staff approved the exemptions.

Now, again, this is very consistent with the NUREG in that the NUREG concluded that the probability of the event was low enough that there were no new requirements necessary. The part that wasn't -- that was new at that time is that Trojan was asked to do some kind of an analysis.

MR. CONGEL: Excuse me, was the link made with the NUREG and that conclusion for Trojan, or was it separately addressed as an item?

MR. ZINKE: The NUREG was mentioned as far as the issue, the NUREG wasn't -- it wasn't decided that per the NUREG now this is acceptable.

MR. CONGEL: Okay. Thank you.

MR. ZINKE: Yankee Rowe --

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: But if I understand your point, on the Trojan docket, apparently the staff said something about Zirc fire which if I interpret Mr. Meisner's opening remarks, that would be essentially the first time it had been imposed and that might be a backfit in and of itself?

MR. ZINKE: Yes. That would be correct. Plus the point I'm trying to make is -- as we'll see as I go through the next example, it was a changed position.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ ZINKE\colon$$ It was something -- it was a different position than the staff had applied to Rancho Seco.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay.

MR. ZINKE: Where Rancho Seco, no mention of Zirc fire, Trojan and Zirc fire has now become an issue that the licensee needs to address and the approval of the exemptions was based upon the probability of the events. Not where the NUREG had concluded -- one of the things the NUREG had concluded was the generic time to the issue is not an issue which ends up about 520 days, 17 months.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Seventeen months, okay.

MR. ZINKE: And the Trojan E plan was approved 325 days after shutdown. So it wasn't on the basis that it can't happen, or that certain temperatures could not be exceeded.

Yankee Rowe was shut down 11/91, their E plan exemption was granted 10/92. With regard to their E plan exemption there was no issue with Zirc fire. That was not a basis for approval of the E plan exemptions. Their insurance exemption approved 4/93 did credit the Zirc fire issue that it was a basis for the approval of the exemptions.

The acceptance criteria for the insurance was based upon having gone past the generic time period of 17 months. So in this case

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AN RI EY & for the E plan no mention of Zirc fire, insurance Zirc fire plays a role, but the acceptance criteria is now based upon the generic 17 months.

[Slide shown.]

MR. ZINKE: For Maine Yankee, and I want to emphasize that as we compare these plants relative to the fuel pool and relative to the event described in the NUREG, Maine Yankee design is not unique. So there isn't anything special about the Maine Yankee fuel or racks or fuel pool design that would all of a sudden say, well, now is Maine Yankee different than everybody else that has come along?

We shut down in December '96, requested E plan exemption in November of '97. We did perform analysis which indicated -- our analysis indicated that the Zirc fire event was no longer possible as of January 16th. We then submitted our insurance exemption request on the 20th of January. On the May 6th, the generic wait period or the generic 17 months, we exceeded that timeframe which brings us up to today that, you know, we're still waiting on approvals of both the E plan and the insurance exemption and the acceptance criteria for what we're being reviewed against isn't real clear, which I'm going to go into in a little bit more detail.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I sense you're trying to draw a parallel between this January 20th, 1998 submittal and the submittal that Yankee Rowe made with respect to insurance?

MR. ZINKE: Yeah, and the --

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: And the criteria used to apparently grant that insurance exemption?

MR. ZINKE: Right. There's been -- in the regulatory arena, there's two issues that have been tied -- so far that have been tied to the Zirc fire issue. One is the E plan exemptions, and one is insurance

exemptions. There's been proposed rulemaking on the insurance which ties acceptance criteria to Zirc fire analysis and exceeding certain degrees. So that was the -- that rulemaking now, you know, it's still not final, but we used that as our best understanding of the staff's wishes relative to Zirc fire when we did our analysis. And those degree numbers were consistent with the NUREG that described the Zirc fire event.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Do I interpret that you believe the staff has changed acceptance criteria and approval criteria from Yankee Rowe to Maine Yankee on insurance?

MR. ZINKE: Yes. For Yankee Rowe the issue were not the temperature, it was the timeframe past.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay. And thus today that review is underway on insurance? This is the insurance?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ \operatorname{ZINKE}\colon$$ Yes, both the insurance and the E plan reviews are still under way for Maine Yankee.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay.

MR. LAINAS: Suppose -- you indicated on January 16th that you submitted an analysis that showed that Zirc fire was no longer possible?

MR. ZINKE: Our analysis as performed showed that that was the date that it was no longer. We actually submitted the analysis to the staff later than that.

MR. LAINAS: Well, suppose it was approved. Suppose the exemption was approved.

MR. ZINKE: Okay.

MR. LAINAS: Would that have made the backfit moot?

MR. ZINKE: It would still have been a backfit.

MR. LAINAS: It still pursued the backfit?

AI RI EY & MR. MEISNER: Yes.

MR. ZINKE: Yes. It doesn't change the fact that it's a backfit. It changes to what benefit we get as to pursuing it.

MR. MEISNER: Let me make something more clear. We, on our own initiative, did this analysis and we did it as a matter of expediency because at that time the staff was starting to tell us verbally that it would be a condition of their approval. Delaying these approvals makes a big difference to decommissioning plants. I'll get into that in a bit. It's very costly particularly when there's no safety benefit associated with it. So we started on a parallel path both the backfit approach and the analysis approach to try to satisfy the staff -- and that -- unsuccessful in the new approach and I'll talk more about that later. We didn't do that because we felt that was a regulatory requirement. It was strictly an expediency for us to proceed with our decommissioning.

MR. ZINKE: What I've just gone over in history is to emphasize that as we look at the dockets of the various plants that have been shut down that the staff position as to what is acceptable with regard to the Zirc fire issue has been changing. Changed from Rancho Seco to Trojan, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, and we're in the batch with also Connecticut Yankee now. So the position has changed. When Maine Yankee was licensed and with our E plan and the changes subsequent to initial licensing the Zirc fire as an issue has never been part of our license basis. It has never been mentioned as forming the basis for any requirement that we have including E plan and insurance. So this is not an issue that has always been there. It is an issue that was new.

As I've just said, you know, it was associated with a generic issue 82 which, as far as we knew, and as far as all the documentation we can find is closed as being resolved with no new

requirements.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: But you would grant that the staff can develop new positions and promulgate those based on operating plant performance, foreign reactor performance, I think Barsobek is a very good example. It's a suction strainer issue with boilers and the retrofit of a suction strainer to ensure that you don't clog your ACCS pumps.

MR. ZINKE: Absolutely.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: And that would be a new staff position imposed on the industry so as we garner additional experience as a staff there are examples where there seems to be safety payback to impose that.

MR. ZINKE: Absolutely. And in fact, that is -- I mean, that is our point in that in the staff there are new positions. And there's justified positions and that's why the backfit rule is so important so that we don't spend our resources on those new things that don't provide the safety benefit.

MR. MEISNER: The whole purpose of the backfit rule in our minds that it provides that test. It tells you, is this safety significant or not? And furthermore, if it's safety significant is the amount of safety benefit you're going to get out of it proportional to the costs? It's a process that we've had around for years, it served us well. In this case the staff never applied it. And backfits are appropriate — any safety significant thing like Barsobek that it needs to be considered. And I think the industry is getting much better about stepping up to the bar and dealing with those issues.

What we object to are issues that don't raise to any level

of safety significance and evaluated and probabilities of ten to the

minus six. And more so that the staff has already done their backfit

AI RI EY & AS evaluation on through generic issue 82. That's the problem.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: That example may be unfair because it's a high profile issue in which there's a lot of interest, the Barsobek issue. In other words, a lot of people are aware, whereas something like this may not be quite the same profile to senior management or what have you, so how does the staff actually handle it? And I think I'm hearing essentially from your perspective you don't see the process being overlaid to issues that maybe are not as visible as some other safety concerns that arise.

MR. MEISNER: That's right. Yes.

MR. LAINAS: But the backfit that you're claiming is that the issue should never have been asked, it should never have been raised. Not as to whether Zirc fires, you know, whether the plant is acceptable, you know, whether the -- your analysis is acceptable, that's not at issue here. The question is we shouldn't -- it shouldn't have been raised at first. All right.

I mean, you may argue that it's a low probability -- you may argue it's a low probability, you know, and the way you analyze, it shows acceptance and all that. That can be -- you know, you can -- we can continue dialogue on that, but that's not your basis. I mean, your basis is it should have been never raised in the first place.

MR. MEISNER: Right. And because the staff has already analyzed it, this isn't an unanalyzed event. Generic issue 82 was proposed solely for this purpose to determine whether additional requirements are needed in the spent fuel pools from a safety point of view. And Zirc fire was one of the issues that was addressed in resolving that generic issue. And the entire generic issue resolution was that thee are no additional requirements that meet the backfit rule, in other words, that are cost beneficial and will provide a safety

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payback proportional to the cost of the --

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MR. LAINAS: I could look at that as resolution of the issue, not whether it was asked in the first place. Maybe I'm getting too fine on the cut here.

MR. MEISNER: Well, the practical effect on us is when we submitted our request for exemption to the emergency client, it's fine for the staff to ask the question. And had it been asked as a question, and I'll get into this again more, we since August, a few weeks after we shut down Maine Yankee, have been looking to get our arms around this and determine for ourselves whether it was a safety significant issue regardless of what the NRC requirements were. And had the staff simply asked, well, you know, give us your evaluation of it and a best estimate approach, we would have done that. In fact, we did it anyway. You know, we --

MR. LAINAS: Right.

MR. MEISNER: -- but to take the next step and say, as a condition of a our approval we have to do -- you not only have to do an analysis that meets our acceptance criteria, but we, the staff, have to do an analysis using an invalidated code and you're going to have to wait until we get up to speed on this and let a contract and come up with acceptable results even though it's clear to everybody, I think, at this point that we're well beyond any time period the adverse event could occur. That is a fact. That really kills us on our decommissioning decision.

MR. LAINAS: You see, that's why I asked the question. If we granted the exemption, does the backfit go away? And the answer I got was no.

MR. ZINKE: That's correct.

MR. LAINAS: Implying to me that the backfit is you should

discussions of, is this code acceptable, or is this code acceptable?

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Until a few weeks ago the code associated with the generic issue 82 was not available to us in order to run our case so we had to pick a different code.

We get into discussing what are the assumptions to the analysis? What do they need to be? How much conservatism needs to be in this assumption versus that assumption? We get into acceptance criteria, well, what acceptance criteria are we going to use that's going to be acceptable? Is it going to be probablistic? Is it going to be based on temperature? Is it going to be based on time? Are we going to deal with the generic acceptance criteria of 17 months, or does each time going to need to be plant specific?

None of these are written down, resolved which then just creates a lot of back and forth, and all of this comes from that as an issue. We didn't follow the backfit process. We didn't follow it even to the point to say, is this an issue that ought to be implemented?

Because if we had followed that process then there ought to be explicit directions so we would know what to be doing right now.

I'm going to turn the rest of the presentation back over to $\label{eq:model} \mbox{Mike.}$

MR. MEISNER: Just a few more comments following up what George was saying.

[Slide shown.]

MR. MEISNER: First of all, I sense some confusion on the part of the panel and we went through the same confusion about why is the staff imposing this anyway? I mean, you had generic issue 82, it was analyzed in backfit space. There wasn't sufficient safety concern to require a new imposition of requirements, why are we in this position? And here's the closest I can figure out, and this is what a couple of the NRC staff have told me. I don't know that this is the

case because you're going to look hard and long to find anything written at all on this issue even the staff position that we have to do the analysis, but this is what I'm told.

When you look at an operating plant and you look at that with respect to a Zirc fire, I'm not really that concerned about a Zirc fire because even if I don't address the Zirc fire, there are still off-site planning requirements that are in place. Now, that's different from a decommissioning plant.

In fact, that's exactly what the exemption is that we're requesting to eliminate off-site planning requirements. So, therefore, there's something substantively different between an operating plant and a decommissioning plant. But when we now look at generic issue 82, the analyses that were done and the issues that were addressed, we find that in fact when they did the zirc fire analysis it didn't assume off-site emergency response. In other words, it didn't analyze the operating case, it analyzed the shutdown case. So that generic issue 82 is as applicable to the decommissioning plant as an operating plant.

So as best I can reconstruct, anyway, the staff -- CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I haven't read the --

MR. MEISNER: -- has an erroneous assumption here.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I haven't read that, the NUREG and maybe we need to read the NUREG.

MR. MEISNER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: But for clarification, are you saying that on your fair reading that if there is this horrific event of a Zirc fire, that there would not be Part 100 ramifications?

MR. MEISNER: No, not at all. I'm taking the NRC's backfit evaluation of the event which is radiologically consequential just like many beyond design basis events and that's what this is. This isn't

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I'm not saying it's inconsequential, I'm saying that the -somewhere you have to draw the line, do I need to be concerned about the
meteor strike through the spent fuel pool? You know, where's the break
point? And the staff has already established that and did it very well
in the generic issue resolution.

part of anybody's license basis. You can postulate many of these events

and we do it all the time in PRA space, go to core damage or something

else, I mean, it's different in this case, but that do have significant

radiological consequences and you assess risks. And risk is probability

times consequences. And you make judgments as to whether or not these

events are of importance. And the staff has had longstanding criteria

as to what the thresholds are and break points are for these in doing

backfit evaluations. And this event evaluates out in the generic issue

as a ten to the minus six event. Which is the basis for concluding that

no additional requirements are necessary for any plant, be it operating

or shutdown for spent fuel pool safety.

The other thing I'd like to mention and I think George really touched on it, as I told you, we analyzed this event. We have been trying to get from the staff the sharp code since last August and for the life of me I still can't figure out why we can't have it.

Although I understand it was just released a few days ago.

We wanted a tool that the staff had some degree of buy into to do this analysis this ourselves. Failing to get that tool from the staff, we then went out and contracted with a very reputable analytic company, ScienTech which NRC uses all the time, too. We used the track code to do this evaluation for us. Probably the simplest application you could have in track, a very simple, straightforward natural circulation error analysis. They did that and that's the results that George presented earlier were mid-January where we could not exceed the

AN RI EY & AS staff's criteria and temperature in the fuel.

The pain we went through though, in doing this, we eventually submitted it to the staff and the staff, I have to grant, was considerate and after some discussion saying, okay, well, we'll sit down with you and we'll look at your analysis, and we did that, what, a month ago, six weeks ago, and we had a meeting and presented our analysis and results. We're now in either the second or the third wave of requests for additional information. And we are bogged in a quagmire like you wouldn't believe. The staff has absolutely no criteria on which to base an analysis like this. It's a beyond design basis event which if you've done probablistic risk analysis, you know, you always do a realistic best estimate approach.

It's not license basis, but I think the staff is having a hard time shifting gears from their license basis analysis review to a realistic review. And in the process, now we have some draft questions pending, draft questions that really do imply that the contractor that we have doing this job was not up to snuff. These are individuals who are well known in the track industry as experts in employing that code. And this is the kind of feedback that we're getting. It's to the point where it's nice that the staff offered to go and look at our analysis, but if you don't follow the right process like George said, if you don't establish, first of all, that it needs to be an event worthy of consideration and second of all what your review criteria are, you're never going to get there.

And I guess at this point I don't have any real confidence in any time under a year the staff will review our analysis and reach a positive conclusion. But, again, that's my personal opinion. So, when you step outside of the process, even as much as you'd like to band-aid it or remedy it and take unusual situations, it's very difficult to make

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it work. But Maine Yankee has taken just about every step we can since shortly after we shut down to deal with this issue one way or another, and it's been very frustrating as I'm sure you can tell from the way I speak, a very frustrating experience for us.

Let's go on to the backfit denial itself. And I would like to establish first what some of our understandings and expectations are as we talk through the issues. And as we started out at the beginning with the presumption that the backfit rule does apply in this case, and I think we're beyond that. Our reading of the backfit staff guidance is that upon a denial the staff is required to provide other bases for denial in the denial letter. So our presumption is that from here on out the staff will not be coming up with new reasons or opinions as to why this is not a backfit and then what we're dealing with and admitting today is the entire universe of staff basis for denial of our backfit request.

MR. LAINAS: I guess we will look at your appeal.

MR. MEISNER: Pardon me?

MR. LAINAS: Look at your appeal and see if that influences, you know, what the original decision is based on.W

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MEISNER: Well, in our appeal and in our meeting today we're directly addressing the basis for denial.

MR. LAINAS: Right. Right.

MR. MEISNER: And we believe it's only fair that from here on out the staff can't come up with new bases, or else I think we need to have another meeting like this.

Well, I'll point out the staff guidance on backfit requires that all of the basis for denial be in the letter that was sent to us. And one other thing and I'm not --

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Just so we're clear, Mike, the panel

certainly may choose to want to get into this NUREG, get into some of the other -- the Trojan docket, the Rancho Seco, things of that sort trying to garner as best knowledge as we can. And we have been reading some of the background on this, as I said in the beginning. We probably have not read everything we should and understand everything which means we may have to go back to the staff to give a better rendering of what was meant here.

MR. MEISNER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: But that's in the context of us assuring we have kind of -- we're playing with as much information as possible.

MR. MEISNER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: And that's why I'm asking to please give us as much information as you can on the topic today just to allow us to have a full deck, so to speak.

MR. MEISNER: Okay. Sure. And with that being said, I hope I at least tried to make clear that the issues today, the issues on appeal have nothing to do with Zirc fire. I believe the only issue is the basis for staff denial is can licensees initiate activities on their own that are protected under the backfit rule. The staff has made no showing that there is a technical issue here. They've essentially agree that it's a new staff position and the only issue is can licensees initiate changes and be protected with the backfit rule.

The last point I wanted to make here is -- and we've included this in our letter, we have ongoing reviews on the emergency plan exemptions and on the insurance exemptions. NRC guidance is such that while we're in this backfit process and appeal process as well, that those reviews can't be held up. And once those reviews are done, the exemption should be issued whether this panel has completed its

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deliberations or not. And I'd just like to read from manual chapter 0514 which states that -- and I can leave out a few words that are inapplicable, but that the "licensing action shall not be delayed by NRC actions during the staff's evaluation and backfit transmittal process or subsequent appeals process which is what we are in now. And I would like to come back to that at the end of my discussion.

[Slide shown.]

MR. MEISNER: Okay. So I probably said it too much already, our reading of the NRC basis for denial of the backfit request is that Maine Yankee has not valid expectation of protection under the backfit rule because it's the licensee, not the NRC that's requesting the exemption. And similar to that, that in the area of exemptions NRC action is discretionary.

Now, I'll point out these next three items on here are addressed in the denial letter and they note that there's a rational basis for the new requirement that the staff is choosing to impose and there's a reasonable nexus between that requirement and the exemption request and that the staff believes this analysis is necessary, but in our view those things really have nothing to do with the basis for denial. And as I'll talk a little bit later, are really a way to create new pseudo backfit criteria in situations where the staff believes that backfit doesn't apply. But the staff can't use these criteria, the fact that there's a rational basis for the new requirement to obviate or work around the backfit rule. So in that sense they did not seem to be a basis for denial in and of themselves, but rather an explanation of what happens after the denial occurs, and an explanation of what can be imposed after the denial occurs.

The first major point that I'd like to address is this notion that we don't have a valid expectation protected by the backfit

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AN RI EY & rule or licensee-initiated changes. And I'm sure you've all read our submittal and I won't belabor points on this, but essentially what the staff is saying is that there's a directionality here associated with regulation that in one case regulations apply, if it's something that the NRC initiates or imposes on the licensee but if a licensee were to take a step allowed under the regulations on their own initiative, then for some reason that's hard to understand licensees are not protected by the backfit rule.

We believe that there's no evidence in the backfit rule statement of considerations and many of the very long discussions on backfit back in the late '80s that would support that conclusion at all. And I want to point out here some of the dangers that we get into with this kind of position. Clearly the denial basis applies to all licensee-initiated changes. The only criterion is that the licensee initiate it. Yet, first of all, it's inconsistent with the NRC's own positions in manual chapter 0514 because that manual chapter very distinctly addresses licensee-initiated changes such as tech spec changes, for instance, and notes that those are protected under the backfit rule.

Now, the practical effect of this new position is very wide reaching and is going to lead to some significant regulatory process disruption. Let me go back to the improved tech spec program. When we implemented that program for Grand Gulf it took about four months of intense discussion and negotiation with the staff involving literally thousands of questions on the staff's part. And there were literally hundreds of times where it was necessary of our part to say, no, no, this is a new staff position. We've already had a very hard fought battle over what the improved tech specs are to say. You cannot impose this at this point, it's against the rules, and in those cases we

AI R] E) prevailed in every case. Our only protection, push come to shove, was that backfit rule, new staff positions.

Putting in place this new interpretation of where backfit rule applies, I believe firmly that there isn't one licensee in the United States that would proceed forward now with the improved tech spec program. Because as soon as they put forward their suggested new tech specs, every change there is free game.

And we know that when we -- even right after all the agreements were struck and a few plants started to initiate this, we knew that there were any number of staff members, primarily review staff, who had disagreements with what was within and without the improved tech specs and did everything they could to try to get the old requirements added back in. That's going to happen.

If a licensee has no protection under backfit to implement the improved tech spec program then it's fair game. Your tech specs won't come out looking anything like the improved tech specs are. That applies across the board.

As changes under 50.59 not unlike George mentioned on the IEEE rulemaking, a licensee makes a change under 50.59 under their own initiative, suddenly somehow there are new staff requirements, the residential inspector can come over and say, hey, I understand you want to make this change, I think you need to do this, this, and this. Or NRC can push through rulemakings like in the IEEE standard and somehow you've got to keep track of these rulemakings that only apply when you're making a change under 50.59 in the area of rulemaking. It would be chaos, a very difficult situation. And we also know, I think, that many licensees make changes not because there is so much elective as they improve safety at their plant, and they often do that under 50.59 or that's their impetus for going in for a tech spec change. So it's

not just like licensees are trying to get out from under something, but it doesn't matter. In any case the NRC can apply with this position any changes and new criteria that they wish to on an licensee-initiated change.

[Slide shown.]

MR. MEISNER: The notion that the NRC determination is discretionary, while I said here it's not discretionary that that really is incorrect. We recognize that the NRC has discretion in the area of exemptions, but we also recognize that a supported exemption should not — approval of which should not be unreasonably withheld. And we think that's the case in this situation. If you go back to the statements of consideration on the decommissioning rulemaking in 10CFR50.82, it's clearly stated, and we've quoted it in our response that the rulemaking changes for decommissioning plans are incomplete.

While 50.82 is a great change on the part of the NRC, it really helped out the industry a lot. It was explicitly recognized that it was incomplete and it was explicitly recognized that it was incomplete in the area of emergency planning. And there is also a clear statement in there that because of these incomplete rulemakings that licensees will still need to get exemptions approved.

So while clearly the NRC has discretion in approving exemptions, I think the record also shows that there was an expectation that licensees would have to get exemptions to proceed in decommissioning because the rules were not all complete yet.

So I think there's an expectation and an appropriate one on the part of the licensee to have those exemptions approved and approved consistent with their prior license basis.

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MR. MEISNER: The staff says that our request is not

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voluntary. I mean, it is voluntary. And this is an important issue for all decommissioning plants. There are internal conflicts in the regulations because emergency planning and security plan and other things haven't been updated for decommissioning plants. I'll give you a couple of examples.

In a few months, I think late September, early October, we're supposed to conduct a biennial exercise under the regulations. And the regulations read such that we have to do that exercise involving our principal functional areas of emergency response. We haven't gotten approval to drop the offside emergency response. We have to conduct an exercise with NRC, FEMA, and everyone else that somehow gets us through a general emergency. We can't exceed 250 millirem today in our design basis event in decommissioning. That can't get us above an alert level.

So we're faced with doing an artificial exercise that's completely unrealistic with adverse training consequences for folks or being noncompliant with the regulation. Now, you know, FEMA is not ready for this. They haven't proposed any budget for it this year, they're not planning -- doing any planning for participation in any exercise and this is solely reliant on the NRC granting relief in the emergency planning area to avoid going through this pretty useless and costless exercise.

The more major problem in our mind is that regulations for decommissioning plants require that decommissioning cost be bounded.

Okay. We can't exceed certain costs and still be compliant with the regulations.

And you all know, I think, that the biggest cost in decommissioning is personnel. And the thing that sets our personnel levels at decommissioning plants is almost solely regulatory requirements and really the programmatic requirements. Emergency

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2.4 25 planning, security plan, QA program, the degree to which you downgrade or declassify your previously safety-related components and do the same thing with your procedure, surveillance activities, tech specs, and the like. That's setting our staffing levels without exemptions to the regulations. And I'm not limiting it here just to emergency planning. It covers those other ones too, particularly security.

We can't meet the regulations. We're in some sense in noncompliance, conceptually today, because we don't have these approvals. We're going to exceed what the NRC considers to be an acceptable cost level for decommissioning absent these exemptions. And it's hard for me to understand how in that case the staff could even come close to considering that these requests we're making are voluntary.

[Slide shown.]

MR. MEISNER: I'll be honest that the statement that irks me the most in this denial is this idea that, hey, Maine Yankee, you can just retain your emergency plan as is. If someone in the industry told me that, I would say that was a very irresponsible position.

Like I said earlier, we can't remain compliant with our cost goals, we certainly can't remain compliant with our fiduciary responsibilities to the people that are paying this decommissioning ad infinitum, the rate payers and the owners, and it's something that no utility person in his right mind would consider doing.

We have to step out, we have to start decommissioning these plants, and we shouldn't be shackled by unnecessary regulatory restraints that don't add any safety benefit to the process. And I think taking a position that we can simply sit still and do nothing is perhaps irresponsible on the part of the NRC as well.

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MR. MEISNER: I'm not going to spend any time on this because this is going longer than I thought, but as I mentioned up front then the staff has through the denial letter posited new criteria for situations where the backfit rule doesn't apply and is now creating ad hoc secondary backfit criteria for what it's okay for the staff to impose on us. I think they really have no relevance to the issue we're here to talk about today and I'd just caution against proliferating criteria under different situations and difficulties in following and applying those criteria.

So in summary, we believe the staff denial ignores precedents. We don't think the staff has rested on precedent at all in this case. If anything they change it with every new plant that comes up. And they surely don't rely on the resolution of the generic issue on spent fuel pool safety. New ad hoc backfit criteria, it clearly reverses the generic issue results with no analysis to back it up and, you know, overall it puts us in the situation where the underlying purposes of rules are subject to change without any notice, comment, or analysis. And, in other words, in the area of licensee-initiated changes, they're subject to any new staff condition that any staff member cares to impose on that change. And this is really an untenable position for the industry as a whole as well.

[Slide shown.]

MR. MEISNER: Let me finish up here with some thoughts.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Can I go back to your summary slide?

MR. MEISNER: Sure.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: The staff denial ignores precedents. Are you familiar with the Trojan exemption?

MR. MEISNER: Well, only to a certain degree. Emergency planning?

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Right. I thought I had heard that somehow the staff had Zircoid fire in that somehow and then somehow I think seismic got involved or --

MR. MEISNER: Yeah, let me address that, George. Specifically for the E plan exemption, the Trojan approval was consistent with the resolution of the generic issue which concluded that there's not sufficiently high probability for this event to be considered further. And it was based on probability that the exemption was approved. There was no analysis of how long do you have to go following shut down or decay the be low enough to reach a certain temperature.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: So in the staff ignored precedents, if there was a precedent, it seems like the most recent case that the staff processed -- and I think the timeline indicates it was Trojan, apparently there's a difference or a significant change between the two reviews?

MR. MEISNER: It wasn't --

 $\label{eq:CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I don't meant to put words in your mouth, but I want to understand.$

MR. MEISNER: Yeah, let me just find it, John, but I thought
Yankee Rowe was --

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: And whatever the criteria were that the staff used and how the safety evaluation -- things it said, whatever, I have not reviewed the --

MR. MEISNER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: But I heard George say, and you guys can speak for yourself, I heard that Zirc fire somehow was involved, but ultimately it seemed to be a seismic concern?

MR. MEISNER: Well, Zirc fire, the initiating event, the

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postulated initiating event for Zirc fire is a seismic event. It's a catastrophic seismic event that busts your spent fuel pool wide open and instantaneously drains all the coolant.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay.

MR. MEISNER: So, therefore, to get there you need to consider the probability of such an event.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: So it ignores precedent, the staff did not apply the way it reviewed Trojan to the way it's reviewing you?

MR. MEISNER: That's right. That's right.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: It still has Zirc fire.

MR. ZINKE: Zirc fire is an issue.

MR. MEISNER: It never got to Zirc fire because it said you can't have the seismic event.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay.

MR. MEISNER: You only get to Zirc fire after you drain the pool. So if you don't drain the pool, you don't have a Zirc fire.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: But we'll be able to review it. But it just seems as if maybe they started with Zirc fire and the licensee ultimately was able to show that's not a credible event because their design of their pool or the probability of a seismic event or --

MR. MEISNER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: -- ultimately now becomes not credible to postulate, thus the Zirc fire goes away. But they may have started with the review being Zirc fire as the design or the criteria.

MR. MEISNER: Yeah, that could very well be. I know we discussed that briefly back in the fall with the staff, and it was clear that they weren't interested in looking at seismic probabilities.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay. I'm just focusing on staff denies -- denial ignores precedents and I'm going back to Trojan and not

having that in front of us, that has the potential to have precedents?

MR. MEISNER: Yeah, you can call that the precedent, John, but my intent for putting that down was the percent was the generic issue resolution. It wasn't the individual approvals as the years went on. The only purpose for which we put that up was to show the staff hasn't maintained a position anywhere. And most of them are inconsistent with the generic issue resolution.

MR. CONGEL: Including that one.

MR. MEISNER: Including that one.

MR. CONGEL: Including Trojan?

MR. MEISNER: Yes, they --

MR. CONGEL: Oh, okay. Because I heard you --

MR. MEISNER: -- that in my mind is a clear backfit. I'm not trying to compare us to Trojan and say the staff should have applied the same criteria to us as they did with Trojan because applying it to Trojan is a backfit.

MR. CONGEL: Okay. Because I thought you said earlier that in accordance with generic issue 82, Trojan was approved because of the low probability. And that's not the case. I believe that they looked at it as an individual case starting with the Zirc fire as John is saying an then had a method by which it was possible to argue that pathway and the conclusions regarding the needed EP away?

MR. MEISNER: That's right. I was simply trying to draw a parallel that the generic issue was resolved based on low probability.

MR. CONGEL: Okay.

MR. MEISNER: And so was, ultimately, Trojan.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: So I was just trying to -- I was trying N $^{
m L}$ to follow each one of your summary points and I wanted to make sure I was understanding it.

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MR. MEISNER: Okay.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: If you want to move on, go ahead.

[Slide shown.]

MR. MEISNER: Okay. Well, just a few more points to make, and these are requests to the appeal panel itself.

We would ask that in this case with the ongoing emergency plan exemption reviews and for the insurance exemption that rather than wait the outcome of this panel deliberations that staff guidance is to -- since we're in the backfit process, to timely proceed with those reviews and issue the exemptions. And I understand that we're very close to the end on those. And one of the reasons why we put in the backfit request to begin with was to short circuit a long, long review time. So given that the staff guidance is to issue those things forgetting the pending issue, we think it appropriate that the panel direct the staff to immediately issue those exemption approvals.

Our second request I talked about a little bit --

MR. LAINAS: Before coming to a conclusion --

MR. MEISNER: Pardon me?

MR. LAINAS: Before coming to a conclusion as to whether this is a backfit or not?

MR. MEISNER: Yes, and let me reread the staff guidance on that from manual chapter 0154 -- 0514. It says that licensing action which is what we're going through now, the emergency plan exemption requests, shall not be delayed by NRC actions during the staffs' evaluation and backfit transmittal process or a subsequent appeals process which is what we're in now.

The intent is that you carve out the issue in dispute, in this case the Zirc fire, and proceed with the remainder of the licensing action. And that's what we're asking the staff to do to simply, in this

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case, comply with staff guidance on their backfit process. And we're asking furthermore that we'd like --

MR. LAINAS: You've got to be a little bit more careful -- right now, all right, the staff is continuing with its review of the issue on its merits --

MR. MEISNER: Independent of Zirc fire.

MR. LAINAS: -- as you requested earlier --

MR. MEISNER: Right. And we're simply asking that those approvals be issued independent of deliberations, sir. I assume the panel isn't going to turn around a decision overnight. And we --

MR. LAINAS: Not overnight. Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ MEISNER: -- would not want the panel's review to hold up the issuance of the approvals.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I think we consider the panel's activity to be holistically independent. We do owe the office director a view and an opinion of this matter, but I'm under the impression the staff is continuing to work day-by-day on both of these.

I'm not aware of any direction to hold up that activity at all.

MR. MEISNER: We did include that in our letter request, the appeal letter. And we addressed it to Mr. Calhan and asked that that -- that the staff be directed to do that. So I am simply reiterating that request here. And we ask as part of your deliberations, like I mentioned up front, that you disallow any new reasons why this is not a backfit that those things should have been included in the backfit denial letter if they were appropriate. And we ask that you determine in this case that backfit in fact does exist.

And furthermore, that in this case the backfit evaluation was really done some years ago and was as a part of generic issue 82

resolution.

And finally, in going back to the context I tried to lay out for this, I'm not sure this appropriate to request of the panel, but we feel that backfit in general is not something staff considers routinely or even exceptionally. And we think the staff has to follow the rules just as much as the licensee does. And I'm not sure that at least the spirits of the rules are being followed in this case, and you know, I'd be happy to go into more detail about examples and things, but I think on their face it's clear that if nothing else, the staff does not consider new positions or does not address new positions as backfit before they issue them and I suspect really doesn't think about it.

But I ask for your help in that respect and it might be worthwhile to take a look as to how the backfit rule is implemented within the NRC and on a generic basis, not just associated with Maine Yankee's request and draw your own conclusions. But in any case I do think it worthwhile for the panel, just as a spot check, call in a few PMs, call in a some reviewers and ask them how many backfits they've identified in the last year and see what the result is. And that's all I have. And I appreciate your time and attention.

MR. LAINAS: I guess we're going to hear something from NEI, I guess.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Yes.

MR. LAINAS: But I think the panel is set to look at what's been going on with respect to Maine Yankee. As far as generically is concerned, I wonder if NEI -- maybe they'll tell us whether NEI is approaching this, you know, generically with the NRC -- the generic aspects of this issue.

MR. MEISNER: We can get into that, but I think it's something worthwhile to consider. You are the first appeals panel in

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1 six years, you know. I mean, that means something. 2 MR. LAINAS: Maybe. MR. MEISNER: And you're the first people that are in some 3 4 position to maybe draw some conclusions that go beyond an narrowly 5 constructed backfit. 6 MR. LAINAS: I wonder how many backfit requests have been 7 made by industry during those six years? 8 MR. MEISNER: Yeah, not very many. Like I said, the 9 industry is apathetic. Once you make one, it doesn't get anywhere. 10 MR. LAINAS: That's right. 11 CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I would like to read, just so the 12 record is straight, you are tasked, speaking to the panel members with 13 recommending to the director, NRR, whether or not the criteria being 14 used by the staff in evaluating a Maine Yankee request for relief from 15 off-site emergency preparedness requirements of 10CFR50.54q costs due to 16 backfit, that was the envelope or the box that we were asked to assess. 17 Some, if not a fair amount of your presentation goes beyond this 18 particular directive. And what the panel will probably do in a 19 different session will probably discuss do we want to render a view or 20 observation or opinion. But I think we have in our charter, a specific 21 direction that we must fulfill and I think your request is, go beyond 22 your charter to render an observation or view. 23 MR. MEISNER: That's right. 24 CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Would that be a reasonable 25 interpretation of your request? MR. MEISNER: Yes. CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Do you have any more questions of the L licensee? MR. CONGEL: No.

MR. LAINAS: No.

MR. MEISNER: I think at this point, did you want to say something, Don?

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Well, if you all are essentially done, I don't think we have anymore questions of your folks. I'd like to move on and afford others an opportunity to speak. And, thank you for your very detailed presentation.

MR. MEISNER: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I must say, just speaking for myself, I will need to read the transcript to really let some of this sink in, and there are other documents. And I think all of us are taking our role fairly -- quite seriously. So, you've given us a lot of information and to digest all of that over a few days is not going to be easy. But we are trying to work in a rather short timeframe.

MR. MEISNER: And I don't doubt that you're going to give this good consideration and due consideration. And I hope you understand on our part, this is not a contentious issue, but a heartfelt issue. And it's something that is really making a difference for Maine Yankee and making a difference in an area that is not safety significant at all. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Thank you.

MR. DAVIS: Don Davis from Connecticut Yankee and Yankee Connecticut. I just had a few comments. I think Mike and George did a superb job at going through lots of details in history and I just wanted to make a couple of points. In fact, I would also try to go beyond your charter, as you read it, to include Connecticut Yankee in that same issue in that essentially everything that Mike said applies to Connecticut Yankee and maybe even with some extra little twists that you ought to consider. Also, I think that this a good forum, not only just

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but I suspect there's going to be others in the NRC management that will, you know, be interested in what was occurring today and so I would make a plea beyond just the backfit issue of some more management engagement in reviewing what's going on in decommissioning, and this is a good example of areas where I think whether it's backfit or just the NRC exercising its management responsibility that needs some focus as it pertains to decommissioning plants.

because of the management contention that you're going to bring to it,

First I'd like to say that specific to CY, Connecticut Yankee, it was shut down around five months earlier than Maine Yankee and most of the licensing actions submittals were, you know, submitted therefore somewhat before that plant and we're essentially in the same position as Maine Yankee waiting for staff review. I think that it's important to look at the safety significance of this issue.

As you brought up, John, you know, I think all of the utilities out there, certainly Mike and I are very interested in dealing with safety issues. And I think we need to look at the safety significance of issues like this. As far as I can see, and I should tell you that Connecticut Yankee did a similar calculation to Maine Yankee to calculate if there was a potential for Zirc fires, and if so, when it occurred. We used a different consultant and a different computer code and concluded in a -- I'd say, a consistent manner with Maine Yankee, that the potential did not exist or certainly does not now exist at Connecticut Yankee.

one by the staff, one by ScienTech for Maine Yankee, one by FullTech for Connecticut Yankee all concluding that there really isn't a potential

for a zirc fire at these facilities. And yet we're still sitting there

And so here we have really three independent calculations,

basically with the requirement for full scope emergency planning, we're

AN RI EY & sitting there paying insurance, costs that hit us at \$3 to 500,000 a month. And the only thing outstanding is staff review of our submittals.

In fact, I understand the staff consultant review and our submittal is essentially, you know, concluded that it looks reasonable. I think we have the same problem that Maine does as to what level of conservatism do we put on this calculation because there's no, you know, ground rules. No standard review plan, no precedent in the regulations for, you know, what should be the right level of conservatism for a situation like this. So here we are, if you will, as far as I know, nobody indicating that there's a safety concern out there and yet the licensing actions aren't being, you know, processed. And we are, you know, it's basically spending a lot of money and decommissioned plants are in a different position than an operating plant when it comes to pending funds. We have a trust fund. We have a limited amount of money available to decommission that facility. And we have a joint, I think, desire to do this decommissioning and finish it up in the best job we can and, you know, I'm sure we can go get more money from the rate payers or from some source if we have to. But it's a much more painful process than for an operating plant or for a plant that's producing, you know, income if you will.

So I think that needs some consideration. I think it's an objective that the NRC has indicated concerned themselves, inadequate funding for decommissioning. And I think that as a result some more attention and priority to deal with the inconsistencies in the regulations that require us to ask for license amendments and exemptions would be prudent. So I would command more from that perspective.

I think that as we deal with the lack of safety significance of this particular scenario, besides being very remote, all of the

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analysis that I'm aware of shows that it's not even a potential. It seems to go, again, counter to the Commission's philosophy of risk-informed decisionmaking. You know, the risk seems to very, very small if it exists at all. And, you know, I think that whether it's this panel or staff management in general, you know, I think some focus on that would be helpful or us.

I think I support everything that Mike and George said about the backfit in general and I think that I would also emphasize the position that Mike had indicated and certainly I share is that the most important thing for both of the plants is to deal with the licensing actions so we can stop paying for insurance that we don't need.

And, you know, the aspects of whether 51.09 apply in backfitting would be useful, I think, for the whole industry to deal with. But for both of our plants, the first priority, if you can help put some more management emphasis on it, is to deal with the licensing action because we continue to have to pay for this, we continue to basically be sending very difficult messages to the local communities as we go out there and communicate to them that we're, you know, going to be eliminating off-site planning, we don't need the sirens, and we explained why, and yet, you know, we don't have the licensing actions to support that.

So, you know, it sends a very confusing message to the public in a decommissioning environment also.

So I would just add, you know, those additional comments to what Mike and George have said.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Are you making an assertion that the agency, in my words, is very heavily focused as far as the operating reactor the ongoing safety of the operating reactors and hasn't applied the appropriate overall management attention throughout the agency to --

MR. DAVIS: Decommission plans?

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: -- in so many -- more of a newer area,

or --

MR. DAVIS: I would agree with that. In fact, I've made this point to Sam Collins in formal settings that I think that it's very much like, you know, when I was at the staff some 20 years ago or more, and we were shifting from licensing plants to operating plants and we needed to develop a separate technical staff to deal with those kinds of issues and the licensing issues, the fact that there were different standards and different levels of safety issues to consider. And I think that same thing happens with decommissioning. We get almost the worst of both worlds. We get like low priority and no attention, you know, in terms of the issues we need to deal with. And, frankly, there are very few issues that we need to deal with. I mean, you know, there's like a handful of licensing actions.

I should tell you now the plant has been shut down for two years, our chemists are still taking -- because the tech specs require them to, because we still have our full power -- many of our full power tech specs still taking chemistry samples of our reactor coolant system and have to do, quote, "engineering analysis" if they're out of specs even though we're getting prepared to inject, you know, chemicals to decontaminate it. And I should say until maybe recently, in the last few days, we still have those tech specs.

I'm not sure we're in transition, but, you know, that just doesn't make sense for a system that you plan to chop up and bury to, you know, do chemical sampling on it. And it's those kinds of things, it would be very simple for the staff to approve license amendments in those areas. And, in fact, they're really generic, I mean, any plant that goes into decommissioning, boom, you know, the kinds of licensing

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actions we need are all the same. And I think a cookbook could be prepared very quickly and those things could be issued -- should be issued very -- in fact, I'm going to advocate to the industry that they try to do mode 7, you know, so that they're not stuck like we are with a year or more waiting for licensing actions or two years just, you know, at this stage. Get mode 7 for decommissioning and save yourself a whole lot of money and aggravation.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I don't want to minimize the significance of decommissioning facilities, but I think I've heard you and Mr. Meisner essentially say in so many words, once you have entered the phase called decommissioning, your view is the staff should be able to act almost immediately to grant relief in areas such as EP, security, et cetera?

MR. DAVIS: Well, within standard acceptance criteria that we can preestablish. I think that's true. I mean, you know, there are some issues that require some time to deal with, but many of them can be pre-established, I think.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: But timeliness of licensing action processing, overall management attention in the area, maybe the two really go hand in glove.

MR. DAVIS: Right. And I understand the staff's position —
I mean, difficulty in that, you know, operating reactor issues there
have a lot more safety significance potentially and they need, you know,
staff priority treatment. But, you know, there needs to be some balance
here because we are in a situation where we're working with effectively
a fixed pot of money to finish off, you know, the tail end of a plant
slide, and in fact, the risk levels are significantly different than
operating reactors. And I think that, you know, the staff needs to
consider that in the way they approach the issues.

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CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Thank you, Don. Mike --

MR. LAINAS: Just real quickly. You could have claimed -you haven't claimed a backfit?

MR. DAVIS: Well, I will informally add CY to the pot because the issues are exactly the same, except that we're, you know, four or five months, you know, earlier in the process but the technical issues are identical. And, you know, I think Mike is -- has said it right in that, you know, we don't see any industry issues here because I think the industry is not convinced that this will ultimately go anywhere. But I think independent again, of whether it's a 5109 issue in a legalistic sense, there's a management responsibility that the staff has to look at issues like this.

MR. LAINAS: How close are you to resolution of this?

MR. DAVIS: Pardon me?

MR. LAINAS: How close are you to resolution?

MR. DAVIS: On this issue?

MR. LAINAS: Yeah, do you know?

MR. DAVIS: You know, I don't know. You know, I think it's fairly close if I take the informal feedback from the staff's consultant. You know, they seem relatively satisfied, but I have no idea of what it's going to take in terms of going through the staff management. I don't know that anybody because it's the first time. I mean, nobody has reviewed one of these calculations before. The NRC staff has it, so it's precedent. How do either of us know since it's the first time? And the raw definition of a backfit is when you're the only one that's ever gone through it. You know, I think it has to be a defective backfit because we -- none of us have any precedent.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay. Thank you. Mike.

MR. MEISNER: Just real quickly before we -- there are only

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decommissioning.

Instead, though, we get into the situations that we're battling here where everything is unique, even though they've done it on five other plants in the past, the instant issue is always unique that a new reviewer comes up with new requirements or pseudo requirements and when you couple that with the fact of very little review time these days, Maine Yankee submitted its emergency plan in November of last year, I'm not sure we had more than one day of review time and we got the reviewer here, he can tell us, until May, June?

a handful of things that licensees need to kick off a very successful

you know, you convert licensed operators to fuel handlers, they need

decommissioning. We need approval for the fuel handlers' requirements,

approval of their defuel tech specs, emergency plan, and security plan,

and then some lesser things like insurance. But those four major ones

manager review and approval without having to go to the review branches.

there's absolutely no reason why that can't be a cookbook, project

In fact, they should be because every plant is the same in the

MR. DAVIS: And just to reiterate --

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MR. MEISNER: On that order, the same thing with security. We submitted a security plan shortly thereafter. We didn't get more than a couple of days of security reviewer time until June.

MR. DAVIS: And just to support Mike, it's the same thing. I had to call up Sy, you know, four or five months ago because Kenyon at Millstone is calling me and saying, you know, I need to take your resources for emergency planning to let the Millstone plant restart. I mean, you know, given the priorities and the consequences, sure, I'll step behind. But, I mean, that's crazy. You know, I mean, in reality to have to make decisions like that from a resource perspective. When you look at the risk significance of what we're talking about, it just

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You have a licensee under Part 50 who submits a request for an exemption

result of that exemption request the staff says we'd be glad to grant that exemption if you will do this little project. Now, that's what we're talking about today is that little project. Is that a backfit imposed on the licensee in the process of trying to achieve some exemptions? And in this case it's the Zircoid fire analysis for the plant and the exemption requests as associated with the E plan as he embarks on a decommissioning mode for his facility.

to embark on some new venture in the operation of this facility and as a

I see five generic issues in this process. One is the applicability of the backfit rule to the decommissioned mode plant. Second is regulatory basis for modifying licensing basis, backfit applicability to licensee-initiated requests, backfit applicability to a discretionary action in decommissioning, and third is backfit -- or the fifth is backfit criteria.

Okay. Now, these issue arise not from the request for exemption or the request that the utility take some action in order to satisfy the reviewers granting that exemption, but from the rationale that comes from the staff in the process of addressing the utility's plea that the imposed requirement is a backfit. So it comes from the thought processes that the staff has developed here and I think those are very important because they set the precedent for future actions on the part of the staff. If we're successful in a condition that says that the licensee-initiated requests and things that fall from that initiated request by a licensee are not subject to backfit, that has significant ramifications throughout the rest of the industry, particularly for the licensees that are going through decommissioning. But it also has implication for other licensees as well.

So in the first, the decommissioning plant really should be afforded the protection in the backfit rule. There is no indication in

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the voluminous rulemaking records for the backfit rule, 51.09, guidance for the backfit it NUREG 1409 or CRGR procedures to indicate that the Commission had any intent to remove Part 50 licensees from the backfit protection simply because they were going through decommissioning. There is nothing that we read in any of those documents that would suggest that there is a change in the applicability of backfit rule and protection as the licensee goes through that phase of operation.

They are still Part 50 licensees and I would argue that if we eliminate the backfit rule, just arbitrarily, then maybe we could eliminate a lot of other rules under Part 50 license requirements simply because we went into the licensing mode called decommissioning. And I don't think that the staff would find that acceptable either. I mean, I think that goes without saying. But that's what the staff has said in the case of the backfit rule.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Your point being Part 50 is Part 50 until --

MR. BEEDLE: You grant an exemption of take the license away.

And Part 50.109 is part of the Part 50 licensing. Or at least the last time I looked it was. And what we've got here in the case of Maine Yankee is the staff has said, Maine Yankee because you're in a decommissioning mode, 109 doesn't apply to you.

Okay. The second issue, it appears that the staff is attempting to impose a new accident sequence in this case, the Zirc fire as a basis for the emergency plan requirements at Maine Yankee and others.

It's tantamount to using the exemption request that the licensee wants to have approved its attempt to have him change his licensing basis in order to grant that request. And there is certainly



a desire on the plant's part to get that exemption. So he's willing to accede to the staff's requirement or request to go conduct one of these analyses.

In fact, that desire is so strong that Maine Yankee embarked on the analysis before the staff ever made a formal request that they do that in response to the exemption request. And we see that happening every day in the utility world. It's the licensee's desire to move forward in this direction and the staff says, and the staff -- when I say "staff" I'm talking from the residential inspector all the way through call Shirley Jackson. They want this -- if you want this then you need to take this course of action and the licensees in general agree that if they're going to be successful, then they need to succeed to the license or to the regulator's desire to take some particular course of action, a study, modification, whatever. And very few utilities tend to balk at the imposition of those requirements. And then the question is, why don't the utilities balk at that? Because they fear that if they don't then they've agreed in their SALP that they are reluctant, they're recalcitrant, they are not agreeable, they do things that we don't like and therefore we drop that SALP, you know. We'd like to see you use your simulator to run emergency plan drills. We want you to simulate. There's no requirement to do that. But there are some reasons where if the utility doesn't use a simulator to run his E Plan drills, you read about that, that the utility isn't using all available, the utility isn't using new technology, the utility doesn't have realism in simulating the emergency plan. So that means just one of the examples of places where you feel the pressure to go do above and beyond requirements because a particular staff member wants that done. So that's what we got in the case of this pressure that goes on that really constitutes backfit.

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CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Your broader assertion takes from Mr. Davis' comment of the old licensing transition to operating reactor. In order to get a license utilities seemingly would accept almost anything. I want to get on plant operating.

MR. BEEDLE: Right.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Now that the licensees are operating, in order to amend the license they'll acquiesce to positions that maybe they don't fully ascribe or had intended to ascribe, but to garner acceptance or approval from the staff to have the amendment issued, they're accepting a priori essentially maybe a backfit and actually adopting that. And now I have precedent, the industry has accepted that precedent, the next licensee may be required to essentially adopt the same precedent. So the staff is essentially backfit.

MR. BEEDLE: Absolutely. Absolutely.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: If I'm reading the operator venue and then the transition over to decommissioning?

MR. BEEDLE: Right.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ BEEDLE: Very well -- stated much better than I did. Thank you.

I think this is a particularly problematic issue in the case at Maine Yankee and Connecticut Yankee on this Zirc fire issue. Here we have a plant that's being asked to either validate or justify or determine whether or not this particular event is something that ought to be incorporated into the design of the decommissioning plant or maybe even backfitted into the design of an operating plant. This is an issue that's been with us since 1989. And why we are in 1998 causing this plant to delay in executing a reasonable program of reduction in an E Plan to resolve an issue that the Agency has had on the table for some

 right?

period of time, just does not make a lot of sense to me. It's almost as though Maine Yankee is being held hostage to resolve some technical concern on the part of a staff member or several staff members. And I think that ought to be a concern to the agency as a whole.

MR. LAINAS: It's also a question on Connecticut Yankee;

MR. BEEDLE: Yeah, I use Maine Yankee kind of as the generic kind of a sense. I want to talk to you -- I don't want to get in between the point and the conditions that Mike is making. I want to try and deal with it in a broader, generic issue all the way. We need to refer to him on occasion, so he's my generic poster.

MR. MEISNER: Thank you.

MR. BEEDLE: You're welcome.

Third, the staff claimed that the licensee submitted this exemption request and is not entitled to backfit protection because it was licensee-initiated. I really find that somewhat incredible that when the licensee request for an exemption and the staff says, we'll grant you this exemption if you embark on this program that that -- the fact that the licensee requested some exemption means that this program that the staff wants to impose isn't subject to backfit just doesn't make a lot of sense to me. That means that every licensee that ever submits an exemption is subject to innumerable modifications to his license without the protection of backfit. That's exactly what it means. Whatever the issue, no matter how significant or insignificant it is, the licensee is going to have to do it regardless of what the licensee feels is the significance of it.

I just find that that's totally inconsistent with the intent N L of the Commissioners when they put the backfit rule in place. And it was the very thing for which the backfit rule was issued.



Four, Maine Yankee in response to the challenge on the backfit issue, Maine Yankee was told that the exemption request was a discretionary issue and that, you know, therefore, this backfit claim shouldn't be considered, that if you ask for an exemption that this — that the staff has the discretion to grant the exemption, we don't doubt that. That's clear. In the case of the decommissioned plant and the decommissioning rule, the things like the E Plan and security plan were clearly recognized as things that would require exemption. I think exemptions were encouraged in the decommissioning rule and it was a matter of the decommissioning rule didn't get around to dealing with those particular issues. So I think there was a clear understanding as you embark on this phase of plant operations understand Part 50 that you would request exemptions to Part 50 in order to allow you to continue the decommissioning process.

So this discretionary character that's been applied to a decommissioning plant's exemption process, I think is inappropriate. I think it's almost a necessary condition in order to execute the decommissioning process.

Now, the fifth point is the criteria. We're using this particular response to the Maine Yankee appeal to establish new criteria for backfit. In other words, if I ask for an exemption, if I can somehow logically tie this request for additional information to or program to the exemption request, if there's some logical link then I shouldn't have to worry about backfit on the part of the staff. That's the kind of criteria that's being established in the Maine Yankee case. And I think that's inappropriate. I think the backfit rule has criteria. That should be the criteria. We shouldn't be inventing new criteria. If we do, we ought to change the backfit rule and put that in there, not do it through individual case situations.

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So, now the observation, and I made it earlier, is that we've got a Zirc fire that's been on the table since 1989, we're now holding this plant hostage while we try and resolve that issue. I just — I think that's inappropriate. I think there's got to be a better way for the agency to resolve technical issues rather than hold an individual plant at risk. And "at risk" is money. It's costing this plant a lot of money to continue to maintain the E plan, security plan and so forth as it goes through that decommissioning process. As he pointed out there is limited amount of money in that trust fund, every dollar he spends needlessly means it's another dollar he can't employ for cleanup or dollars that he can't use in other places that might be more appropriate.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Is your point that the agency should get on with completion of rulemaking such that the industry has a well understood set of criteria basis expectation of the staff, predictability of the regulator?

MR. BEEDLE: I think that the --

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Because I think your issue is not so much this particular licensee, as the generic base.

MR. BEEDLE: Right.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: And I think you're saying, do something generic so that this doesn't recur?

MR. BEEDLE: Correct. It's becoming clear with the Maine Yankee case that the application of the exemption process in the decommissioning plant phase is not as clear as we had expected it would be. We had thought that the exemption from E Plan requirements and security requirements and so forth would be relatively clean, that we wouldn't have other things tacked on there so it was -- you know, I don't we ever really concerned ourselves with having a change in 109 in

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rule.

yeah.

order to make those things more clearly defined, although maybe that's what we need to do. I think the staff could do that tough.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: I guess my point was more into 50.82 and into decommissioning itself. It --

MR. BEEDLE: Well, yeah.

MR. BEEDLE: Yeah.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: -- fill it all up, make it a whole

MR. BEEDLE: Yeah. I said "109", but I meant 82 the, yeah,

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Okay.

MR. BEEDLE: In the case of 109, if we want to change backfit rule criteria, then we ought to change 109 and not do it through this process -- this process of trying to deal with an exemption for Maine Yankee.

So with that, I do appreciate the opportunity to raise some generic issues. I recognize your charter is to deal specifically with Maine Yankee, but I think that what you have today is an opportunity to look at -- while you're focused on Maine Yankee, you have an opportunity to look at the broader issue and maybe it will be another six years before we come back with some backfit rules if you can figure out how to convey the right message to the senior members of the staff there. So, thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Thank you.

MR. BEEDLE: I would add one other thing. I had asked some N L folks at NEI to prepare some detailed comments. I would like to provide these to you if I may, and give you -- it gives you some of our thought

Thank you.

processes in examining the record and the regulations on the issues that we just talked about.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Would you have any problem with those being appended to the minutes of this meeting?

MR. BEEDLE: Not at all. Not at all.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: So we'll attach it to transcription.

MR. BEEDLE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Are there any other members of the public that would like to speak?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ PIETRANGELO: I've got a couple little things beyond what Ralph said.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Please --

 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ \operatorname{PIETRANGELO}:\ \operatorname{Until}\ \operatorname{everybody's}\ \operatorname{bladder}\ \operatorname{bursts},\ \operatorname{I}\ \operatorname{can}$ get them in.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Please identify yourself.

MR. PIETRANGELO: Tony Pietrangelo from NEI.

These are in addition to what Ralph said and what's in the paper he just handed you. I'm the director of licensing at NEI and have a lot of day-to-day interaction with our members dealing with licensing issues and submittals to the staff in terms of discretionary acts and voluntary activities and such. Mike mentioned before, there's some reluctance to apply the backfit appeal process and that licensees may be apathetic about that. And I think that's right based on my interactions with our members also. But I think part of the reason though is that there's a perception that went -- and I think this happens when a backfit claim is made it tends to polarize the licensee from the agency, from the people you have to interact with. Typically what happens is the lawyers dig in on each side trying to make the case and I think it's

an interaction that most licensees really don't want to have with the NRC. You want to maintain good relations with your project manager and the other people you have to deal with in the agency. Just the backfit claim in and of itself is not healthy to that relationship long term and I think that's partially the reason for people not exercising the processes as Maine Yankee has today and I commend Mike and George for doing this. I think they're trying to do it in a very constructive way and not in a contentious way. And my point is it doesn't have to be contentious and I think the conduct of this hearing proves that out.

The second point I wanted to make is that there's been a perception that the purpose of the backfit rule is to protect licensees from the staff running amok. And I don't think that's in the statement of considerations that supported the promulgation of the backfit rule. And I think what it boils down to is that that rule is really there to assure that resources, both agency and licensee resources are applied commensurate with the safety benefit.

It's not in anyone's interest for a licensee to go off and have to spend a lot of resources and the agency to review those actions associated with that if it doesn't result in a commensurate benefit with safety. That's the purpose of the backfit rule and that is a public health and safety issue. So this is not just an economic issue for decommissioning plants. And I would argue today that this is even a bigger issue for the operating plants today.

In Maine Yankee's case it's not a safety issue because there is no real risk significance in a decommissioned plant, in particular, for the stage that they're at in their decommissioning. When the same thing happens at an operating plant and I think as Mike said before, the real issue here isn't Zirc fires, it's that a voluntary licensee action is being claimed that the reason that the backfit rule doesn't apply.

But when an operating plant goes in and needs some action from the NRC, it has to go through this kind of thing. It does have a greater impact on safety as well as costs. So I would argue, because of that, this is a bigger issue for operating plants than it is for decommissioning plants.

Finally, this panel has an opportunity to make this a more normalized process by your decision. And I'm glad it's being transcribed and that's the reason we're here today is to, again, support our members, but also try to make this generic point that this isn't just about decommissioned plants. This is about public health and safety and if the proper application of this rule will support increased public health and safety. And I would argue, even protect the NRC more than the licensee itself. And when claims are made about some safety concerns that really don't have risk significance, yet we go through these exercises, that's not in the interest of public health and safety. And when the NRC can demonstrate that the backfit criteria are not met in a very transparent publicly observable way, that's to the agency's credit. And those are the only points I wanted to make in addition to what Ralph said.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Any questions?

[No response.]

MR. PIETRANGELO: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Thank you very much.

Are there any others?

[No response.]

N T. CHAIRMAN ZWOLINSKI: Well, I thank all of you for your attendance and as I said in the opening remarks, this panel has been charged to take all the facts as best we can corral them and grow to understand those, and make a recommendation to our office director.

 $\ensuremath{\mbox{I'll}}$ bring the meeting to a close and thank everyone for their time. [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the meeting was concluded.]